Why Iran is risking so much over the Strait of Hormuz

After 10 days of exchanging strikes with the US over control of the vital Strait of Hormuz waterway, Iran's leaders may appear to have three choices. None offer a clear route to victory.

The first is to accept much of what Washington wants: guarantee free and safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz by ending attacks on commercial shipping, give up or dilute Iran's stockpile of highly enriched uranium, and accept intrusive inspections by the global nuclear watchdog.

In return, Tehran would seek an end to the US naval blockade on Iranian ports, sanctions relief, and protection from further attacks.

This is probably the least costly option, but also the costliest politically.

Reopening Hormuz without securing a recognised Iranian role in managing the waterway would mean surrendering what some in Tehran increasingly see as a newly discovered deterrent, one that may now appear more effective than Iran's missiles, regional proxies, or even its nuclear programme.

For the first time, the Islamic Republic has demonstrated its ability to impose immediate costs on the global economy for an attack on its territory by its enemies.

The nuclear programme, meanwhile, has long been presented as a right that Iran cannot be forced to abandon.

Conceding to demands for tight restrictions on nuclear activities after months of attacks would allow hardliners to argue that American military pressure had worked. It could also open the door to further demands over Iran's missile programme and its relationships with Hezbollah in Lebanon, Iraqi Shia groups and Yemen's Houthis.

The second option is escalation. Iran could intensify its attacks on American bases in the region, shipping, and vital infrastructure in Gulf Arab states, hoping that higher energy prices and wider disruption would force Washington and its allies to compromise.

This carries the greatest military risk. An attack causing mass casualties or serious damage to Gulf infrastructure could draw Iran's neighbours more directly into the conflict and leave it facing a broader coalition.

The third option is to preserve the current instability: enough pressure on shipping and energy markets to retain leverage, but not enough to trigger a return to all-out war with the US.

This seems to fit the Islamic Republic's established thinking. Iran does not need to defeat a stronger enemy if it can survive for longer than that enemy is willing to fight. Survival itself can be presented as victory. But sanctions, war damage and inflation are steadily increasing pressure at home.

And as time goes on, a paradox may emerge: The more Iran uses the Strait of Hormuz as a weapon, the less powerful it could become if countries find new ways to export energy and other goods out of the region.

Parliament speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf has acknowledged the contradiction, arguing that the value of Hormuz lies in increasing the volume of shipping through it rather than reducing it. A permanently unsafe waterway encourages the world to find ways around Iran.

Complicating matters further is the uncertainty surrounding Iran's decision-making process.

Under Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who was killed in a strike at the start of the US-Israeli war with Iran in February, disputes between elected politicians, clerical institutions and the Revolutionary Guards were ultimately settled by the supreme leader. After months of war and under the new leadership of Khamenei's son Mojtaba, that balance of power is less clear.

President Masoud Pezeshkian and his diplomats may favour a settlement to ease economic pressure and restore stability. Hardliners in parliament, powerful unelected institutions, and conservative media outlets, meanwhile, may fear that major concessions would undermine the ideological foundations of the Islamic Republic and alienate its core supporters.

The biggest question concerns the armed forces, particularly the Revolutionary Guards. Iran's missile programme, regional alliances and strategy in the Strait of Hormuz are central to the Revolutionary Guards' influence, yet it remains unclear how much weight commanders carry in decisions over escalation and negotiations.

The three options facing Tehran do not impose the same costs on different parts of the system. Pragmatists may favour a deal, hardliners may prefer endurance, while some military commanders could see escalation as strengthening Iran's bargaining position.

The question, therefore, is not only which path Iran chooses, but who has the authority to make that choice.

The leadership's idea of endurance looks very different to those required to endure it.

Iran and the US signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in June to halt military operations and reopen the Strait of Hormuz, as well as to reach an agreement to end the war over the following 60 days. But three weeks after it was signed, US President Donald Trump declared the ceasefire "over" after Iranian attacks on ships in Hormuz, and US strikes in response.

One woman in Iran told BBC Persian that she was "very, very saddened" when the fighting resumed.

She had hoped the MoU would give the two sides time to resolve the remaining disputes and restore stability. Instead, she fears the destruction of infrastructure and the deaths of civilians and military personnel.

She blamed hardliners inside the Iranian system for imposing destructive policies, while also condemning opposition figures abroad who, in her view, had encouraged war.

Another woman in Tehran said the foreign-trade company where she worked had closed, leaving her unemployed for four months despite holding a doctorate and having 17 years of experience.

"No-one is hiring because nobody knows what will happen," she said. She described soaring prices, power and water cuts, increased theft, and occasional gunfire at night. She now limits how often she travels around the city.

These accounts do not point to a single political conclusion. Foreign attacks can produce anger against the United States and Israel even among opponents of the Islamic Republic. But they also illustrate the limits of asking the public to endure indefinite hardship in the name of resistance.

Trump faces difficult choices of his own: widen the war, continue military and economic pressure, or accept a settlement allowing Iran a restricted civilian nuclear programme under stronger supervision. None offers a clear path to victory.

The confrontation could continue for months through cycles of attacks, mediation and temporary ceasefires. The decisive question is how long Iran's leaders can preserve Hormuz as leverage without provoking an all-out war, renewed unrest or the construction of alternative routes that make the strait matter less.